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1. Introduction 
Geohazards correspond to hazards that involve geological or geotechnical phenomena like 
earthquake, landslide, subsidence… Such hazards are generally classed into natural hazards 
even if their origin is not always natural, as for mining subsidences that are the consequence of 
industrial underground excavations. Geohazards are mostly investigated for the purpose of 
risk analysis. Studies first concern hazard (HAZUS®MH MR4, Romeo et al. 2000, Wahlström  
and Grünthal 2000) and vulnerability assessment (Zhai et al. 2005, McGuire 2004, Hazus 1999, 
Spence et al. 2005, Ronald et al. 2008), and secondly risk assessment and management 
(Karmakar et al. 2010, Merad et al. 2004). However, risk management must deal with many 
uncertainties that concern different aspects of risk assessment. This chapter aims to clarify the 
interactions between risk management and uncertainties within the context of geohazards. 
Uncertainties may first be semantic when applied to the definition of the vocabulary used in 
risk analysis related to geohazards. Risk is generally synthesised as the conjunction of 
hazard and vulnerability (Karimi and Hüllermeier 2007), but many definitions are available 
for both terms. Moreover, themselves use terms that are mostly discussed in the literature, 
such as resilience (Klein et al. 2003). As a consequence, a precise definition of risk is 
necessary, in a given context, to avoid many misunderstandings amongst public authorities, 
scientists and citizens that may arise from semantic problems. Such a precise definition 
should not be interpreted as better than others but as a consensual definition adapted to the 
specific context of each study. This goal is addressed in Section 2 of this chapter. 
The third section addresses the question of the relationship between risk and uncertainties 
and the identification or classification of the different possible uncertainties. While many 
authors consider aleatoric and semantic uncertainties (Bogardi 2004, Adger 2006, Ezell 2007) 
as the two main groups, this part focuses on other classifications and highlights definitions 
of uncertainties. 
Finally, this chapter focuses on two specific aspects of the uncertainties and risk analysis 
related to geohazards: risk prioritisation and vulnerability assessment. These two aspects 
are illustrated with recent trends developed in the field of risk management within the 
context of mining subsidence hazards.  Some final remarks are offered in Section 4.   
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2. Risk, hazard and vulnerability 
Before any risk analysis, a precise definition of the risk is required to avoid 
misunderstandings amongst public authorities, scientists and citizens, the main actors 
involved in or concerned with such an analysis.  
Many definitions are available, and none of them should be considered “the best”. Of 
greatest importance is being aware of the complexity of risk and the fact that each definition 
focuses on different aspects of risk. In this chapter, definitions given by the United Nations 
(UN/ISDR 2004) are first presented as a reference and then discussed by comparison with 
other definitions. 
2.1 About risk 
The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction defines Risk as “the probability of harmful 
consequences or expected losses (deaths, injuries, property, livelihoods, economic activity 
disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from interactions between natural or human-
induced hazards and vulnerable conditions” (UN/ISDR 2004). UN/ISDR then adopts the 
classical definition expressed by the formula: Risk = Hazards x Vulnerability. A note 
specifies that “some disciplines also include the concept of exposure to refer particularly to 
the physical aspects of vulnerability”. 
Risk is also a mathematical concept, mostly used in economics and engineering and defined 
as the mathematical expectation of losses or gains. This definition takes into account the 
occurrence probability of each possible consequence in terms of gains or losses. Therefore, it 
is usually necessary to estimate the occurrence probability of every event responsible for the 
consequences.  
However, in natural risk assessment or industrial risk assessment, the mathematical 
expectation of losses is rarely computable because of uncertainties. One usually prefers to 
work with a risk matrix based on simple formulas, such as Risk = Frequency × Severity for 
industrially generated risks (Cox 2009, Suddle, 2009, Aven 2010) or Risk = Hazard x 
Vulnerability for naturally generated risks (Karimi and Hüllermeier 2007), where 
Frequency, Severity, Hazard or Vulnerability are defined using simple scales with few 
levels. 
Even for these simpler definitions, risk assessment involves many difficulties. Consequently, 
most practical applications for risk analysis related to geohazards aim to identify different 
geographical areas associated with a reference event, i.e., the largest event in intensity that is 
likely to occur over a specific area during a fixed period of time. In many cases, the risk 
analysis is limited to the hazard assessment, and the vulnerability is basically investigated 
with an identification of the assets only. These assessments and the associated zoning are 
used to define legal specifications as standards for civil engineering projects. 
On the whole, the definition of risk is a challenge, but it is necessary to avoid confusion and 
misunderstandings. In this chapter, we adopt the definition suggested by the (UN/ISDR 
2004), where a risk is defined by the two components of hazard and vulnerability. In this 
definition, hazard is a notion that includes both the probability of an event and its intensity, 
while vulnerability characterises the assets’ susceptibility to damage. 
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2.2 About hazard 
The term hazard is primarily used to designate natural feared events as opposed to 
industrial accidents. This common designation is a consequence of the chosen risk 
definitions, which do not consider the same components: hazard x vulnerability for natural 
risks and frequency x severity for industrial risks. Natural hazards include geo-
environmental hazards, such as earthquakes, floods, ground movements (e.g., landslides or 
subsidence) and fire. The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction defines a Hazard as 
“a potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may cause the loss of life 
or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation”. 
The definition of hazard is, on the whole, clearly stated as the combination of both the 
probability of occurrence of an event (e.g., an earthquake and flood) and the intensity of 
the event. Assessment of these two components is based on different methods, which can 
be empirically, theoretically or statistically defined. Whatever the method used, 
assessment of both the intensity and the probability are spoilt by uncertainties because of 
poor knowledge. 
When natural hazards are cyclic, i.e., when phenomena are assumed to be stationary, a 
Poisson’s statistical process can be considered. If historical data are available and sufficient 
in number, statistical analysis can then be used to assess a return period of the hazard in a 
given place or the probability of occurrence during a fixed period of time. For extreme 
events, historical data may be insufficient in number, and assumptions are necessary with 
respect to, for instance, the Gutemberg-Richter law for seismic activity or the Weibull 
statistical distribution for floods. 
The advantage of a statistical analysis is that predictions can be validated by observations at 
a certain level of confidence. When a very large number of historical data are available, they 
can be used to assess both the trend of a hazard (probability and intensity) and the 
sensitivity to each parameter to understand the physical and mechanical phenomena that 
lead to an event. When historical data are few in numbers, as is often the case for ground 
movements such as subsidence and landslides, only the trend can be studied. However, risk 
analysis may require a good understanding of the influence of a set of parameters to go 
deeper into the analysis and the prediction of occurrence. Statistical analyses can then be 
combined with analytical models to capture the influence of the studied parameters. 
Finally, the choice of the intensity parameter is difficult because it corresponds to a 
simplification of the phenomenon, as in the following two examples:  
 The height of water for flooding situations might be chosen, even though the duration 
of the flood and the speed of the stream may also be important;  
 The peak ground acceleration for earthquakes might be chosen, even though the 
amount of damage also depends on the duration of seismic activity and its spectra; the 
volume of unstable rock masses for landslides and other conditions.  
When different parameters are available, it is necessary to select the one that is the most 
appropriate to assess the damage. Indeed, the two concepts of hazard and vulnerability are 
not completely independent. For example, in the case of ground subsidence, the maximal 
vertical ground subsidence is appropriated to assess the intensity in regard to the 
modification of rivers or pipe flow, but the horizontal ground strain that is not maximum in 
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the same area as the vertical subsidence is appropriated to assess the intensity in regard to 
the building resistance. 
On the whole, hazard is the component of risk that is the most investigated and the easiest 
to assess and to plot on a map for risk management purposes. When hazard consists into a 
range of possible intensities associated to different occurrence probabilities, engineering 
studies generally simplify analysis and also consider a maximum reasonable event. This 
event may correspond to the maximum intensity that already occurred when such data are 
available, or to a selected occurrence probability or return period (a century return period 
for flooding for example). On the contrary, vulnerability analysis involve more difficulties 
due to its more complex definition. 
2.3 About vulnerability 
The concept of vulnerability is used in many definitions of risk, but its definition still raises 
discussions. The United Nations, through the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 
defines vulnerability as “the conditions determined by physical, social, economic, and 
environmental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of 
hazards” (UN/ISDR 2004). 
A comparison of definitions is useful to grasp the notions included in the term 
“vulnerability”. Ezell (2007) summarises 14 definitions of vulnerability, and (Griots and 
Ayral 2001) make an inventory of 17 definitions and split the vulnerability concept into two 
elementary notions: 1) the notion of sensibility, susceptibility, weakness and predisposition, 
and 2) the notion of damage, impact, consequences and losses. To study vulnerability, then, 
it is necessary to assess the susceptibility (first concept) of exposed assets to the considered 
hazard and the potential consequences (second concept) that may occur as a result. 
The susceptibility (first concept) depends on different factors that are not only physical but 
also social. Schmidtleim et al. (2008) give an example that proves the importance that should 
be given to the social characteristics of the concerned community in the case of a hurricane. 
Other definitions lead to the same conclusion. For example, (Haimes 2006) defines 
vulnerability as “the manifestation of the inherent states of the system (e.g., physical, technical, 
organizational, cultural) that can be exploited to adversely affect (cause harm or damage to) that system” 
to measure the risks to critical infrastructures from terrorist attacks and natural disasters. 
In France, the Ministry in charge of the Environment defines vulnerability as the “level of 
foreseeable consequences of one natural phenomenon upon assets” in which assets are 
“people, goods, activities, means, heritage... likely to be affected by a natural hazard” 
(MATE, 1997). This definition highlights that damage and its consequences (concept 2) may 
involve a large number of different assets. 
For human-caused security threats, (McGill et al. 2007) describe five dimensions of the asset-
level consequences: fatalities that take into account the number of deaths and injuries; repair 
costs measured in dollars; value of assets lost (e.g., goods, property, and information) 
measured in dollars; time to recuperate measured in units of time; and environmental damage. 
This definition highlights the fact that consequences may be of different types and that it is 
simplistic to reduce them to a cost. Mining subsidence events in Lorraine, France, showed, for 
instance, that social damage occurred in addition to direct costs associated with damage. 
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Schmidtleim et al. (2008) define vulnerability as “the likelihood of sustaining losses from 
some actual or potential hazard event, as well as the ability to recover from those losses”. 
This definition highlights the importance of resilience. Resilience is a concept that is largely 
discussed by Klein et al. (2003). Based on several definitions, they suggest restricting this 
term to describe “the amount of disturbance a system can absorb and still remain within the 
same state or domain of attraction; the degree to which the system is capable of self-
organisation; the degree to which the system can build and increase the capacity for learning 
and adaptation”.  
Based on similar considerations, Bogardi (2004) still reveals uncertainties due to several 
points: the question of “how far should vulnerability be seen as the ‘susceptibility’ alone or 
being rather the product of hazard exposure and that very susceptibility?”; the question of 
the “proper scale (national, regional, community, household or individual) to capture and to 
quantify vulnerability”; and “whether (social) vulnerability can adequately be characterised 
without considering simultaneously the response (coping) capacity of the same social 
entity”. 
From a theoretical point of view, the susceptibility of assets to damage may be 
dependent on the intensity of the hazard. Considering that this intensity may differ 
widely in its probability, a study of the vulnerability might lead to as many elementary 
studies as the number of various potential hazard intensities. Because of the number of 
studies that this theoretical point of view would lead to, engineers used to consider a 
reference event to make a single assessment of the vulnerability for a specific value of the 
hazard intensity. 
The second question is also considered by (Balandier 2004), and it highlights the fact that 
the same risk element does not have the same importance depending on the type of 
hazard and the surface area concerned (e.g., country, city, district) because of their 
relative importance. 
The third question refers to the resilience concept that has already been discussed. 
In summary, the vulnerability term has many different meanings. It is of greatest 
importance, then, to clearly define the held meaning before engaging in any study. Figure 1 
shows a possible synthesis, where the vulnerability is split into three components: 
1. Weakness includes the physical vulnerability and is linked to the strength of assets 
(buildings and facilities in particular). The vulnerability increases as the value of the 
weakness increases. 
2. The stakes value includes the functional vulnerability and is linked to losses associated 
with functional damage. The vulnerability increases with the increase of the stakes 
value. 
3. Resilience as defined by Klein et al. (2003). The vulnerability decreases with the increase 
of the resilience. 
In this synthesis, the assets are used to define elements that may be damaged (e.g., people, 
buildings, infrastructures, goods, and activities). The stakes value is used to define the 
importance of these elements according to the cost of repairs or the possible other 
consequences of damage (e.g., functional damage and social damage). 
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Risk
Hazard
Weakness Resilience Stakes
Susceptibility Impacts
Probability ForseeableIntensity Consequences
Vulnerability General definition (UN, 1992)
UNISDR, 2005
Likelihood Losses Schmidtleim et al. (2008)
Possible synthesis
Natural Hazard (MATE, 1997) 
 
Fig. 1. Synthesis of different definitions for the Vulnerability term. 
We have so far discussed risk, hazards and vulnerability, but without taking into account 
uncertainty.  Next, we will investigate uncertainty as opposed to risk.   
3. Uncertainty versus risk 
A simple illustration of the notion of uncertainty is given by (Chacko 1990): when you throw 
a coin or a die, you know what results are possible, but it is unclear which of these outcomes 
will be achieved. For Chacko, uncertainty is not the ignorance of the possible outcomes 
(there is even a certainty on this issue in the case of the dice game), but the indeterminacy of 
the result that will happen. This uncertainty results, in particular, from the equi-probability 
of possible outcomes that prevents any rational estimate of the result. If the possible 
outcomes were not equally probable, the player would be well advised to bet on the number 
with the highest probability of occurrence. In making this choice, the player would certainly 
take a risk (that a different number falls anyway) but a calculated risk. 
We see in this example, if a little simplistic and formal, that the concepts of uncertainty and 
risk are related. In common parlance, these concepts are often confused, but they refer to 
different situations that (Knight 1921) proposed be defined as follows: a “risky” situation is 
defined as a situation in which random outcomes can be attached to an objective probability 
distribution, while the outcomes of an “uncertain” situation cannot be associated to any of 
such probability distributions. This distinction has been discussed at length, particularly by 
economists. The notion of risk as understood by Knight is indeed “only valid for repetitive-type 
decisions taken within a relatively stable economy” (Galesne, 1996), while for (Hoskins 1973), this 
definition would in fact “eliminate any reference to the notion of risk as part of the business life” 
because the different possible states of the world are, in practice, difficult to define objectively. 
Moreover, economic practice has repeatedly shown that one can assign subjective 
probabilities, the fruits of experience, expertise or beliefs, to improve forecasting and decision 
making. Therefore, many authors have preferred to define a situation at risk as a situation for 
which a probability distribution, whatever its nature, objective or subjective, could be 
associated with its possible states. Inversely, an uncertain situation would be a situation in 
which no probability distribution can be assigned (Galesne, 1996). Within the same idea, 
(Callon et al. 2001) suggested a simple definition: “we know we do not know, but that's about all we 
know: there is no better definition of uncertainty”. In contrast, the risky situation is a situation 
where we know something, whether the knowledge is probabilistic or not (objectively or 
subjectively), provided that this knowledge can assist in making a decision. 
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In summary, we can state that the notion of risk is associated with a rational decision based on 
the knowledge, which is possibly limited, of the states of the world, while uncertainty refers to a 
difficulty in describing, in deciding or in assessing the consequences of possible decisions. Risk 
is something for engineers or managers, while uncertainty would be more for the researcher. 
However, this differentiation is mainly that of economists, decision theorists or even 
sociologists. Physicists and engineers are more tolerant of speaking about uncertainty and 
even of describing probabilistic states, and we suggest introducing now the different types 
of uncertainty that they primarily consider. 
As shown in (Hacking 1975), from its emergence as a field (in approximately 1660), probability 
has been considered to have two faces (“Janus-faced” nature of probability). On one side, 
probability is statistical and applies to stochastic distributions of random processes; on the 
other side, it is epistemic and may express a degree of belief in the truth of propositions having 
no statistical nature. It is remarkable that a single term could continue, to this day, to designate 
these two radically different concepts: frequency and belief, objective and subjective 
probability, a posteriori and a priori probability, random and epistemic probability.  
On this basis, different authors have tried to qualify the different types of uncertainties, such 
as (Haimes 2004), who suggested distinguishing between aleatoric uncertainty and 
epistemic uncertainty.  
In geoengineering or geotechnical engineering, Benjamin and Cornell (1970), Ang and Tang 
(1984), Veneziano (1994), Paté-Cornell (1996), Hofer (1996) and, more recently, Baecher and 
Christian (2000, 2003) have also discussed the meanings of uncertainty in their field.  
Aleatoric uncertainty is sometimes called the natural variability, being inherent in nature 
and not reducible (Gilbert and Tang, 1995). It has also been called objective or external 
uncertainty (NRC, 1996). This uncertainty is the result of the variability observed in known 
populations (Paté-Cornell, 1996), and it has a relationship with a long series of similar events 
(Baecher and Christian, 2003). Aleatoric uncertainty can also be described as a measurable 
uncertainty (as Keynes did in 1921 in his Treatise on Probability) by statistical methods. For 
simplicity, we can say that this uncertainty refers primarily to uncertainties in the data 
resulting from their random nature in space and time and from their small number, their 
inconsistency, their poor handling, transcription errors or low representativeness (in 
samples) (Baecher and Christian, 2002). 
Epistemic uncertainty is itself often referred to as model or parameter uncertainty reflecting 
a lack of knowledge (Baecher and Christian, 2003; Gilbert and Tang, 1995; NRC, 1996) or a 
subjective or internal uncertainty (NRC, 1996). Some authors use the term ambiguous 
uncertainty (Pate-Cornell, 1996; Smith, 2000). This type of uncertainty reflects the inability of 
a model to translate the physical reality modelled or the impossibility to choose a model or 
the fact that a model cannot fit in time or be able to integrate new data (Baecher and 
Christian, 2002), which also refers to the robustness of a model. When this uncertainty is the 
value of a parameter, it may result from the uncertainty of the data (random uncertainty). 
Epistemic uncertainties may also reflect the uncertainty regarding the veracity of a used 
scientific theory or a belief about the occurrence of an event. These uncertainties do not rely 
(or rely very little) on experimental data; they are subjective and typically vary from one 
person to another (Baecher and Christian, 2002).  
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Hofer (1996) provided a good illustration of the difference between aleatoric and epistemic 
uncertainty. Consider two dice, one of which (A) is covered and left untouched, and it is 
unknown which side is up, while the other (B) is being cast continuously. The uncertainty 
about the number shown is then epistemic in the case of (A) because there is a lack of 
knowledge about it, while it is aleatoric in the case of (B). We can estimate the likelihood 
(objective probability) of each number in case (B), while for (A) we can only assess subjective 
probabilities based on what we know about the preferences of the person who put the dice 
on the table. 
However, this distinction is sometimes a modeller’s choice. For instance, in a calculation 
with a numerical model, it is much different to consider the cohesion of material as a space 
random variable (aleatoric uncertainty) or as an ordinary random variable with a unique 
and constant unknown value to be selected (epistemic uncertainty). 
As suggested by (Haimes 2004), the aleatoric uncertainty category refers to temporal or 
spatial variability and to individual heterogeneities, while epistemic uncertainty comprises 
model uncertainty, parameter uncertainty in used models, and uncertainty in decision 
making from modelling.  
While no misunderstanding arises from these definitions, epistemic uncertainty 
encompasses too many aspects to be practically used as a unique concept, which is why 
(Baecher and Christian 2003) suggested considering the uncertainty in decision making as a 
3rd specific category of uncertainty excluded.  
Similarly, for the purposes of a risk analysis, we have suggested (Cauvin et al., 2008) 
distinguishing between not only two or three categories but four classes of uncertainty, 
ranging from a very general to a very specific uncertainty attributed to (1) the scientific, 
economical, and politic context of the risk study; (2) the expertise applying to deterministic 
human choices; (3) the use of models; and (4) the randomness and/or the lack of knowledge 
on data.  
Figure 2 illustrates these 4 categories.  
 Resources uncertainty deals with knowledge about both the general scientific context of 
the study and its local particularities. More specifically, it concerns the existence of 
information about the processes being investigated and the objects being studied.  
 Expertise uncertainty concerns all of the choices, actions or decisions that can be made by 
the expert while realising the risk study. It mainly relies on his particular experience as 
an individual, on his subjectivity and on the way he represents and interprets the 
information he has gathered.  
 Model uncertainty is basically induced by the use of tools to represent reality. Finally,  
 data uncertainty represents both the natural variability existing in the data, the lack of 
knowledge about their exact values and the difficulty of clearly evaluating them.  
The first 3 categories clearly cover the previously defined epistemic uncertainty, while the 
last one refers partly to the aleatoric uncertainty (natural variability) and partly to the 
epistemic uncertainty (lack of knowledge). 
Moreover, we suggest in Table 1 some methods that can be carried out to deal with these 
uncertainties depending on their types. 
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Fig. 2. Four categories of uncertainty in risk analysis 
 
Type of 
uncertainty 
Strategy 
Data 
- Use of confidence intervals or safety margins 
- Use of probability functions 
Model 
- Comparison between model outputs and reality 
- Integration of various models into the analysis 
Expertise 
- Comparison between outputs of various models 
- Use of a decision-aided approach 
- Use of counter-evaluation 
- Use of technical methodological guides 
Resources 
- “as if” strategy (qualitative assessment about the existence of a 
source of danger; we act “as if” it exists, for instance) 
- Index of existence (quantitative assessment of the degree of 
confidence in the existence of a source of danger; we try to 
quantify how confident the experts are about the existence of a 
danger, for instance) 
Table 1. Some methods to deal with uncertainty, depending on the type of uncertainty (after 
Cauvin et al., 2008) 
4. Research trends for risk analysis 
Research trends concern all of the features of the risk. It is always possible to go further in 
the analysis, the assessment of the occurrence probability and the intensity of a hazard. A 
large number of researchers deal with this matter. In this section, two different topics are 
specifically investigated. 
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The first is the use of multi-criteria methods for risk assessment. These methods display 
different advantages that can be useful to improve risk management and to take into 
account expert or data uncertainties, while they have been widely used for decision-aid 
problems.  
The second topic is the assessment of the physical vulnerability, i.e., the assessment of the 
physical expected losses, such as damages to buildings and infrastructures. An interesting 
approach is the use of vulnerability and fragility functions. These functions are already 
widely used in seismic risk assessment and are now being developed for other hazards. 
These functions offer an effective response to the problematic uncertainties regarding 
damage assessment because they are probabilistic in nature. Moreover, these functions are 
easy to compile into software, and they can then be used to develop a probabilistic 
assessment of the vulnerability. 
4.1 Multi-criteria methods for risk assessment  
Multi-criteria decision-aid methods that have been used and developed in and for 
economics are now more widely used in all types of problems involving a decision process 
with uncertainties and the knowledge of the preferences of decision makers. 
We are introducing here an example of the use of a multi-criteria method, more specifically, 
a method named ELECTRE, to deal with a risk zoning problem regarding a mining hazard 
in Lorraine. 
4.1.1 Mining hazard in Lorraine (France) 
The extensive mining activity in the French “Lorraine” region has created a large number 
of underground abandoned cavities that are now responsible for mining subsidence 
events, i.e., significant movements at the surface. These events result in serious damage to 
housing and other buildings in the area of influence of such movements. Mining 
subsidence is of a highly accidental nature when it takes place over mines that use the 
abandoned rooms and pillars method, even though this method should have allowed 
endless ground stability. Recent cases of mining subsidence (1996, 1997 and 1999) that 
have taken place in the Lorraine iron mining area highlight the hazard of such mining 
works when left abandoned. 
The subsidence events that have happened in Lorraine have led public authorities to carry 
out investigations over the entire Lorraine iron-mining field to assess the hazard, 
vulnerability and risk of the whole territory. The first investigations highlighted the 
existence of approximately 20 km2 of urbanised areas undermined by abandoned works 
consisting of rooms and pillars. 
Different strategies and prioritisations have been put forward since 1996 (see Figure 3). 
There was an initial prioritisation based on a very simple assessment of the hazard (section 
4.1.2). Then, a second prioritisation based on a multi-criteria analysis was carried out 
(section 4.1.3) to handle more sophisticated considerations regarding both the hazard and 
the vulnerability (Deck et al. 2009)  
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Fig. 3. Development of risk assessment in the Lorraine iron-ore field. 
4.1.2 First ranking system 
As a result of the subsidence events in Lorraine in 1996 (Auboué), 1997 (Moutiers), and 1999 
(Roncourt), as well as sinkholes in 1998 (Moyeuvre), public authorities ordered 
investigations to understand the extent of the problem. 
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Because of the lack of knowledge regarding subsidence phenomena, the first ranking system 
was based upon two main considerations: 
- - the subsidence probability based on the value of the extraction ratio; 
- - the subsidence intensity based on the value of the maximum expected vertical 
subsidence. 
The first ranking system was in agreement with the regulations of the French urban code 
(articles R111-2 and R111-3). The system defines three types of areas depending on the 
maximum possible subsidence and the associated recommendations for building projects, 
see Table 2. 
 
Maximum subsidence < 1 m 
Surface of building < 400 m2, Maximum length < 25 m, 
Number of floors ≤ ground floor + 3 
Maximum subsidence < 2.5 m 
Surface of building < 150 m2, Maximum length < 15 m, 
Number of floors ≤ ground floor + 1 
Maximum subsidence > 2.5 m Forbidden 
Table 2. The first ranking system used in Lorraine regarding the mining subsidence hazard 
and corresponding recommendations. 
This first ranking system is called step 1 in Figure 3. This step deals mainly with the urban 
side of the vulnerability and is not suitable for the other aspects of vulnerability, especially 
human, social, and economic vulnerability. 
4.1.3 Multi-criteria ranking system 
Supplementary investigations were necessary to perform a more detailed hazard assessment 
and for the human vulnerability assessment. We developed (Merad et al., 2004) a method 
based upon a multi-criteria analysis using the ELECTRE methodology (Roy, 1985; Roy and 
Bouyssou, 1993). The mathematical functions included in the method allow the management 
of a “complex decision-making problem where the available information is uncertain and imprecise 
and where knowledge is incomplete” (Merad et al., 2004). This method uses weighted factors for 
all criteria, and it stresses their relative importance in risk assessment. 
In this method, each studied zone is described by a set of criteria that characterises the 
hazard (probability and intensity of the subsidence) and the vulnerability. Each criterion is 
expressed in its own unit, and weighting factors are taken into consideration. What is 
unique in the multi-criteria ELECTRE methods is the specific way used to combine the 
criteria in the global assessment (here risk assessment) process. Indeed, the global level of 
risk does not rely on a mean value computed over the criteria but on the comparison of the 
studied zones in pairs or with predetermined virtual zones characterising the limits between 
the four risk classes or levels. 
More practically, in the case of the ELECTRE III method, all zones are compared with each 
other based on all criteria. A zone is then considered as more risky than another if a majority 
of criteria (weighted factors taken into account) give a higher risk for this zone compared 
with the other. Such a comparison in pairs leads to a global order of the zones from the most 
risky to the least. The main disadvantage of this method is that any new analysed zone may 
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change the global order already obtained, which is not easy to manage in practice when the 
objective is to decide actions to be taken on the most risky zones first. 
Therefore, in the Lorraine case, the ELECTRE TRI method has been used. This method 
consists of comparing each studied zone to 3 predefined virtual zones that a group of 
experts has considered as the limiting zones between each level (group) of risk. Practically, 
as illustrated in Figure 4, if you call Zr1 the virtual zone that experts consider to be the limit 
for all criteria between the level of risk 2 and the level of risk 1 (the most risky), and if you 
want to classify a new zone Zi (dashed line in the Figure) relative to Zr1 (resp. Zr2, Zr3), you 
have to compare Zi with Zr1 (Zr2 and Zr3, respectively) regarding all criteria, and you 
decide that Zi is more risky than Zr1 (Zr2 and Zr1, respectively) if a majority of criteria 
confirm that decision.  
 
Fig. 4. Principle of virtual limiting Zones (Zr1, Zr2 and Zr3) between classes of risk and 
comparison of a zone Zi (dashed line) with them 
This explanation of the ELECTRE method is a bit simplistic. In fact, the method offers many 
nuances, which can be found in (Merad et al. 2004). One is the way the method deals with 
uncertainties. 
Because of uncertainties, it is not always easy in practice to say whether the value of a 
criterion for the studied zone Zi is really higher than the value of the same criterion for the 
reference zone, Zri. ELECTRE methods deal with such problems by the use of fuzzy logic so 
that the limits between the risk levels become fuzzy intervals (Figure 5, top). 
Figure 5 illustrates the principles of dealing with uncertainties in the ELECTRE TRI 
method. At the bottom of the figure, we can see how a zone Zi is compared with a virtual 
zone Zri regarding the criterion j. The value cg(Zi S Zri), called the local agreement index, 
is a value between 0 and 1 that indicates to what degree we can consider that Zi is more 
risky than Zri regarding the selected criterion j (x-axis). The figure shows that we 
consider a certain uncertainty characterised by both p and q so that Zi is considered 
more risky than Zri when the value of the selected criterion on Zi (called gj(Zi)) starts to 
be higher than gj(Zri)-p. Then, the weighted mean of the local agreement indices over all 
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criteria provide a global agreement index (value between 0 and 1), which indicates 
whether Zi is globally more risky than Zri. The same calculations have to be performed 
to reversely compare Zri and Zi because this comparison is not symmetrical (i.e., Zi can 
be considered as more risky than Zri, and Zri can also be considered as more risky than 
Zi because of uncertainties). Finally, the methods can state the risk group to which any 
zone Zi belongs.  
 
Fig. 5. How the ELECTRE TRI method deals with uncertainties. gj is the value on criterion j, 
q is the indifference threshold and p is the preference threshold. The top chart shows the 
uncertainty on each criterion as a band at the left of each Zri profile. 
This methodology has been applied to constructed zones (civil security objectives), where 
the main objective was to identify zones requiring specific surveillance because of their 
high-risk level. Therefore, the studied zones have been placed in one of the risk groups 
given in Table 3. An extension has then been applied to non-urbanised zones from a land-
use planning perspective. 
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Level 1: Very high risk Real-time monitoring 
Level 2: High risk 
Periodic monitoring, which will become real-time at the first 
forewarning. 
Level 3: Medium risk 
Supplementary investigations are required to assess the need for 
periodic monitoring. 
Level 4: Slight risk 
No monitoring is required.  
Only levelling measurements are made. 
Table 3. Second ranking system used in Lorraine regarding the mining subsidence hazard 
and the corresponding recommendations in terms of monitoring. 
Regarding the vulnerability assessment within the risk analysis method, two kinds of assets 
were considered: buildings and infrastructures. Figure 6 shows the used criteria and their 
weight factors in the analysis.  
In the case of buildings, no other asset is taken into account. The buildings’ assets are then 
assessed with one criterion that may have 5 values, from “business park”, which 
corresponds to a small vulnerability level because of its single daily activity, to “city”, 
which corresponds to the highest vulnerability level because of its daily and nightly 
activities and the potential number of affected people. This classification reflects the 
population vulnerability and, to a lesser degree, the economic or structural vulnerability, 
as these kinds of vulnerabilities are indirectly taken into account because they increase 
with population.  
The weight factors linked with the probability, intensity and vulnerability criteria raise a 
question related to the previously given definitions of risk. If risk is the product of hazard 
and vulnerability, does the sum of the weight factors for each component have to be equal? 
In a multi-criteria ranking system, the sum of the weight factors related to the hazard 
criteria reach the value of 46, while the sum of the weight factors related to the vulnerability 
criteria reaches “only” a value between 2 and 14, depending on the assets in the area. This 
difference produces results that are more dependent on hazard than on vulnerability. 
Consequently, this multi-criteria ranking system may be criticised because it focuses on 
hazard assessment rather than on risk assessment. 
Apart from this problem, we are convinced that multi-criteria methods are exceptionally 
well suited to risk analysis because they easily accommodate uncertainties and inaccuracies, 
and they can easily take into account experts’ or decision makers’ opinions in the evaluation 
process. 
This section shows how the uncertainties influence may be taken into account with multi-
criteria methods in order to develop operational tools for experts or decision makers. 
However, the final results are mostly dependent on the uncertainties about each component 
of the risk assessment. For instance, the vulnerability assessment is very simple in the 
presented case and strictly restricted to the presence of assets in the studied area. For this 
reason, the next section focuses on the vulnerability assessment and the development of 
vulnerability functions that take into account some uncertainties.    
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Fig. 6. Criteria and weight factors used in the actual assessment of risk, hazard, and 
vulnerability in the Lorraine region regarding the iron field mining subsidence hazards. 
4.2 Building vulnerability  
Today, building vulnerability is primarily investigated with vulnerability and fragility 
curves. These curves are a powerful way to manage data and model uncertainties associated 
with the assessment of building damage. Many curves have been empirically developed for 
different hazards based on case studies and statistical analyses of existing damage. 
However, each curve may be specific for a given place and a given event, and their use in 
another context may be contestable. An interesting way to strengthen empirical curves and 
reduce uncertainties associated with the choice of vulnerability curves is to develop 
theoretical curves that may be calibrated for any specific context. Moreover, such theoretical 
curves can then be used for sensitivity analysis and assessment of the dependency on data 
and model uncertainties. The present chapter illustrates a methodology to develop 
theoretical vulnerability curves based on Monte-Carlo simulations within the context of 
mining subsidence hazard. 
4.2.1 Concept of vulnerability curves 
The vulnerability of buildings and territories to natural hazards is often studied with 
vulnerability and fragility curves that allow assessment of the damage distribution for a 
given number of building types in relation to the event intensity, see e.g., earthquakes 
(HAZUS 1999, McGuire 2004), flooding (USACE 1996, Jonkman et al. 2008, HAZUS), 
volcanoes (Spence, 2005), and tsunamis (Ronald and Hope 2008). Fragility and vulnerability 
curves are thus developed for a given building type, and they allow quick and realistic 
damage assessment of all buildings grouped into the same type. 
Vulnerability and fragility curves use the following three main types of input data: 
1. A damage scale 
2. A building typology 
3. An intensity criterion 
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For example, the EMS (Grunthal, 1998) considers a six-level damage scale that consists of no 
damage (D0), slight damage (D1), and so on, up to very heavy damage (D5). Most of the 
existing methods define an equivalent number (four levels of damage in the HAZUS and six 
levels in volcanic risk assessment (Spence et al. 2005)).  
The building typology must be defined according to the most important parameters 
relevant to the resistance of the buildings against the considered hazard. For instance, 
the building materials (e.g., concrete, wood, and masonry), the quality of the 
construction, the type of foundations, and the global stiffness of the building are 
important in earthquake engineering. For example, the EMS (Grunthal, 1998) considers 
11 main building types. 
The criterion for the event intensity may be a physical parameter (height or speed for a 
tsunami or acceleration for an earthquake) or an empirical one (earthquake intensity in 
EMS). 
Fragility curves provide the probability of reaching or exceeding a given damage state as a 
function of the intensity of the natural event (see Figure 7b), and they are usually modelled 
by lognormal functions. A crucial point is that fragility curves clearly take into account that 
not all buildings of the same type will suffer the same level of damage for a given event 
intensity, which can be interpreted as the consequences of the uncertainties about the data of 
both the building characteristics and the hazard intensity. 
Vulnerability curves are relationships between the mean amount of damage for a given type 
of building and the value of the event intensity (see Figure 7c). Vulnerability curves may be 
deduced from fragility curves with Eq. 1: 
 D k kP D    (1) 
where µD is the mean damage for a given intensity, Pk is the probability of a damage grade 
Dk, and k is the range of damage category (from 0 to 5 in the EMS damage scale, for 
instance). 
The example shown in Figure 7 concerns a massive stone masonry building (type M4), 
according to the EMS-98. Figure 7a shows the damage distribution for this type of building 
during an earthquake of intensity 11. This distribution can be plotted in Figure 7b, where 
each dot on the figure corresponds to the different fragility curves of this type of building. 
By calculating the mean of the damages (Eq. 1), it is then possible to plot one point of the 
vulnerability curve, as shown in Figure 7c. Fragility and vulnerability curves may then be 
modelled by fitted mathematical functions. 
In practical terms, when developed and validated, fragility and vulnerability curves are 
both efficient and accurate. Vulnerability curves are used to obtain a synthetic result of the 
mean damage to buildings in a selected territory. When applied to a single building, 
fragility curves may be used to assess the probability of reaching a particular damage level. 
When applied to a set of buildings, fragility curves may be used to assess the damage 
distribution of all buildings. 
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Fig. 7. Damage distribution (a), fragility curves (b), and vulnerability curves (c) for the M4 
building type, according to EMS-98 for the assessment of earthquake building damage. 
4.2.2 Methodology to define vulnerability and fragility curves 
The methodology adopted to develop vulnerability and fragility curves where data are not 
sufficient in number (no previous event or no statistical data available) is based on the 
damage assessment of a set of theoretical buildings whose characteristics are consistent with 
a particular building type but are also variable to take into account the variability in the type 
and uncertainties (Saeidi et al. 2009, 2011). The method is based on five steps (see Figure 8). 
The first step consists of making preliminary choices regarding a damage scale, an intensity 
criterion of the considered hazard and a method for the building damage evaluation.  
The second step consists of defining a building typology and choosing the representative 
characteristics of each type. Each characteristic is supposed to be deterministic or 
probabilistic, (defined as a range of possible values with an attached probability 
distribution) to take into account variability into a given building type and uncertainty 
about its evaluation. 
The third and fourth steps consist of a Monte Carlo simulation. For each type, the third step 
consists of simulating a database of 1000 virtual buildings whose characteristics (e.g., height, 
length, materials, and mechanical properties) are consistent with the studied building type. 
The fourth step consists of evaluating the damage of the 1000 simulated buildings for one 
value of the intensity criterion and counting the number of buildings in each damage class. 
The results may then be used to plot a set of points for both the fragility curve (probability 
of reaching or exceeding a given damage class) and the vulnerability curve (mean damage). 
Finally, by repeating this step for all of the values of the intensity criterion, both the 
vulnerability and fragility curves can be drawn. 
The fifth step consists of fitting a mathematical model to the results to express the fragility 
and vulnerability as mathematical functions. A tangent hyperbolic function can be used for 
the vulnerability functions and a lognormal function for the fragility functions. 
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Fig. 8. Methodology for the determination of vulnerability and fragility curves in the 
subsidence zone. 
Next, we illustrate this approach on the Lorraine case.   
4.2.3 Application 
The Lorraine region features large quantities of iron, salt, and coal deposits that were 
heavily extracted until the beginning of the 1990s (salt continues to be mined here). The 
presence of former iron mines raises many issues, including that of building vulnerability. 
Five subsidence events occurred between 1996 and 1999 (two in the city of Auboué in 1996, 
two in Moutiers in 1997, and the last in Roncourt in 1999), which caused damage to more 
than 500 dwellings (see Figure 9). Many other cities and villages in this area may still be 
affected by this phenomenon. The described methodology is applied to develop 
vulnerability curves within the context of mining subsidence hazard.  
Mining subsidence is a consequence of the collapse of underground mines and quarries. It 
produces significant horizontal and vertical movements at the ground surface. The 
maximum value “Sm” of the vertical subsidence is usually considered as a characteristic of 
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the trough, but the horizontal ground strain “” is mostly correlated to the associated 
structural damage. Consequently, the horizontal ground strain that involves from an 
horizontal compression near the centre of the subsidence to an horizontal extension near the 
edges is used to assess the hazard intensity and the associated potential damage. The 
assessment of  is possible with different methods (Whittaker and Reddish 1989). 
 
Fig. 9. Description of the main characteristics involved in mining subsidence and associated 
consequences (Saeidi et al. 2009). a) Typical profiles of the ground displacements and 
locations of the compression/sagging and traction/hogging areas. b) Typical values of the 
subsidence dimension and grounds movements. c) Typical damage due to mining 
subsidence in the city of Auboué, France. 
The methodology for the development of vulnerability curves requires the use of a damage 
assessment method. Many methods have been developed within the context of mining 
subsidence hazards. Some methods are empirical (NCB, 1975; Wagner and Schumann, 1991; 
Yu et al., 1988; Bhattacharya and Singh, 1984; Dzegniuk and Hejmanowski, 2000; Kwiatek, 
1998) and based on retro-analysis, while others are analytical and based on mechanical 
models (Boscardin and Cording, 1989; Boone, 1996; Burland, 1997; Boone, 2001; Finno et al. 
2005). Most of these methods use a four- or five-level damage scale, and they consider the 
horizontal ground strain for the hazard intensity.  
In the following, the methodology is illustrated with the most simple but popular method of 
the (NCB 1975), which links building damage (five levels) to the building length and the 
horizontal ground strain. Other methods can also be used (Saeidi et al., 2009, 2011), and the 
results will be compared and discussed.  
The second step requires defining a building typology. Most of the buildings in the Lorraine 
region are small masonry buildings with or without reinforcements and can be classified 
into five types (four masonry building types MR1 to 3 and MC1 and one concrete frame 
building CF1). For example, the MR2 building type consists of a 10 to 20 metres long 
masonry of rubble stones, a height of 5 to 8 metres, poor quality mortar without protection 
against mining subsidence effects, a cellar and concrete slab and a simple external shape 
with good symmetry of the bearing walls. 
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The third step consists of the simulation of a database with 1000 theoretical buildings. To 
complete this database, the variability of each criteria used in the different methods of 
damage assessment is considered to be in agreement with the building type. A uniform 
distribution is used to define the final value of each building. This variability within a 
building type may be interpreted both as a real physical and observed difference between 
the buildings and as uncertainties concerning their real characteristics. 
For example, when the NCB method is considered, the 1000 theoretical buildings only differ 
in length, which is randomly chosen between 10 and 20 m. Therefore, the development of 
vulnerability functions requires a proper definition of the variability of each parameter used 
by the considered method. Preliminary tests, with a number of buildings between 200 and 
2000, showed that 1000 buildings provided acceptably accurate results.  
 
( )
( ) ii
N D
P D
n
   (2) 
where N(Di) is the number of buildings in the damage class “Di” and “n” is the total number 
of buildings (1000 in this example). 
The vulnerability curve is the relationship between the mean damage and the horizontal 
ground strain and is calculated with Eq. 3. 
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
    (3) 
where D() is the mean of damages for the value “” of horizontal ground strain and P(Di) 
is the probability of damage in the class ”Di”, as calculated by Eq. 2. 
The plot of mean damages is given in Figure 10 and shows a discontinuous curve that is the 
consequence of using threshold values in all of the empirical methods. This result is hardly 
compatible with reality because damage should continuously increase with increasing 
horizontal ground strain. This assumption is also corroborated by the shape of all 
vulnerability functions developed in other fields, where a tangent hyperbolic function is 
often used (Lagomarsino et al., 2006). To determine a continuous building vulnerability 
curve in agreement with the discontinuous curve previously plotted in Figure 10, a tangent 
hyperbolic function may be fitted on data according to Eq. 4 
 ( ) [ ( )]D a b Tanh c d        (4) 
where D() is the mean of damages for a value “” of the horizontal ground strain and a, b, 
c, and d are four coefficients that must be determined for each building type. 
These parameters are not independent; two relationships exist between them. According to 
Table 3, for a horizontal ground strain equal to zero, there is no damage to buildings, and for a 
horizontal ground strain greater than 9 mm/m, the mean damage to buildings is maximum 
and equal to four (greatest level in the damage scale). Therefore, this leads to the two 
boundary conditions detailed in Eq. 5, and only two parameters must still be determined. We 
used a nonlinear regression method to find the best values of these two parameters. The final 
continuous vulnerability curve for the “CF1” building type is shown in Figure 8. 
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Fig. 10. Vulnerability function and curve for the CF1 building type, built from Table 7. 
The next step in determining vulnerability and fragility curves is the damage assessment for 
all theoretical buildings for different values of the horizontal ground strain between 0 and 
10 mm/m. 
The damage level of each building is calculated for the different values of horizontal ground 
strain, and the probability of damage in each damage class “P(Di)” is calculated with Eq. 3. 
The influence of the damage assessment method is investigated in Figure 11, and it is a good 
way to assess the model uncertainty if no arguments are available to privilege one method. 
The results of the vulnerability curves for the MR2 building type (Table 5) obtained with 
different methods show significant differences. In particular, the NCB method gives less 
damage than the other methods; consequently, this method is considered less conservative. 
A mean vulnerability curve can be calculated. Unless the user has scientific arguments for 
justifying one method by considering the special features of the studied case, it may be 
concluded that the mean method MD() gives the most probable damage assessment.  
The results are then compared with empirical data of damaged buildings in Lorraine (see 
Figure 11). This comparison shows that there is a good agreement between the observations 
and the calculated vulnerability curves. Nevertheless, some differences remain for the lowest 
and greatest values of the horizontal ground strain. The vulnerability functions underestimate 
the damage for the lowest values of the horizontal ground strain (less than 3 mm/m), and they 
overestimate the damage for the greatest values (greater than 9 mm/m). One possible 
explanation for these differences is the existence of preliminary building damage due to 
building aging and other building pathologies (e.g., settlement during construction). For the 
greatest values of the horizontal ground strain, the overestimation of the damage shows that 
there are always some building types that are stronger than the predicted resistance. 
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Fig. 11. Vulnerability curves for MR2 type by all methods (left) and comparison with 
observed damaged buildings in Lorraine (right). 
In conclusion, vulnerability functions are a powerful and operational way to assess building 
vulnerability over a large territory. If statistical analysis of previous damage due to a 
specific hazard is the easiest method to get and validated such an approach, other methods 
must be developed when such data are missing. This example presents an innovative way to 
develop such functions. Based on Monte Carlo simulations, the method allows taking into 
account both variability and uncertainties. However, some steps of the methodology can be 
questioned, in particular when the 1000 theoretical buildings are simulated. First the choice 
of the statistical distribution for each parameter is not evidence; secondly the method 
actually doesn’t consider correlations between parameters (e.g. long buildings may also be 
the highest for instance). This should be addressed in future work. 
5. Closure and future work 
Risk analysis is a complex field because of the numerous different forces that interact to 
assess the risk and to define solutions for the risk management. Public authorities, scientists 
and citizens may have different objectives, and they seldom use the same definitions. 
Consequently, a clear definition of the terms used in risk analysis is a preliminary step 
before analysing other sources of uncertainties. 
Uncertainties may then be classified into various types that highlight different possible 
features, such as the possibility to quantify them or not with statistical or probabilistic 
distributions, fuzzy logic or any other method. Finally, many sources of uncertainties may 
be identified, for which different solutions can be suggested. 
Two examples have been investigated. The first deals with a decision-aid method that is an 
interesting approach to managing expertise uncertainties. Based on multi-criteria analysis, 
initially used and developed in and for economics, this decision-aid method has been 
developed for the risk management of areas vulnerable to mining subsidence hazards. The 
second example deals with vulnerability assessment and, more specifically, with building 
damage assessment. The use and development of vulnerability functions are an interesting 
way to manage both model and data uncertainties. 
In sum, these two examples illustrate how uncertainties can be taken into account for risk 
management related to geo-hazards. However, it is obvious that uncertainties may complicate 
the risk assessment that must be understood and discussed amongst public authorities, 
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scientists and citizens. A difficulty, then, is the ability of scientists to both manage 
uncertainties, with more or less complex methods, and communicate the results to allow for 
good understanding and use by public authorities and citizens without oversimplifications. 
6. References 
Ang A. H-S. & Tang W.H., (1984) Probability concepts in Engineering Planning and Design, 
Vol2 – Decision, Risk and Reliability, John Wiley & Sons, New York. 
Aven T. , On how to define, understand and describe risk, Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety, Volume 95, Issue 6, June 2010, Pages 623-631. 
Baecher G.B. & Christian J.T. (2000), Natural Variation, Limited Knowledge, and the Nature 
of Uncertainty in Risk Analysis. Presentation to The 25th Anniversary Engineering 
Foundation Conference on Risk and Uncertainty in Water Resources Engineering, 
Santa Barbara, October, 2000. 
Baecher G.B., Christian J.T. (2002), The concept of uncertainty in geotechnical reliability, Not 
published. 
Baecher G.B. & Christian J.T. (2003), Reliability and Statistics in Geotechnical Engineering, 
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Balandier P. (2004). Urbanisme et Aménagements – Objectifs et problématiques. Collection 
Conception Parasismique 
Benjamin J.R. & Cornell C.A., (1970) Probability, Statistics and Decision for Civil Engineers, 
Mc Graw Hill, New York. 
Bhattacharya S, Singh MM. Proposed criteria for subsidence damage to buildings. Rock 
mechanics in productivity and protection, 25th Symposium on rock mechanics 
1984;747-755. 
Boone, 2001 
Bogardi J.J. (2004). Hazards, risks and vulnerabilities in a changing environment: the unexpected 
onslaught on human security. Global Environmental Change, 14, pp. 361-365. 
Boscardin MD, Cording EJ. Building response to excavation – induced settlement. J. of 
Geotechnical Engineering 1989 ; 115: 1-21. 
Burland JB. Assessment of risk of damage to buildings due to tunnelling and excavation. 
Earthquake geotechnical engineering, editions Ishihara, Balkema, 1997 ; 1189-1201. 
Callon M., Lascoumes P., Barthe Y. (2001), Agir dans un monde incertain - Essai sur la 
démocratie technique. Seuil, Paris. 
Cauvin M., Salmon R., Verdel T. (2008), Dealing with uncertainties in the context of post 
mining hazard evaluation, Post-Mining 2008, Nancy, February 6-8. 
Chacko G.K. (1990), Decision-Making under Uncertainty : An Applied Statistics Approach, 
Praeger Publishers. 
Cox. (2009). What’s Wrong with Hazard-Ranking Systems? An Expository Note, Risk 
Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 7, pp. 940 - 948. 
Deck O., Verdel T., Salmon R. (2009). Vulnerability assesment for mining subsidence hazard. 
International Journal on Risk Analysis – Risk Analysis, Vol. 29, No. 10, 1380-1394. 
Dzegniuk B, Hejmanowski R, Sroka A. Evaluation of the damage hazard to building objects 
on the mining areas considering the deformation course in time. Proceedings of Xth 
International Congress of the International Society for Mine Surveying, 2-6 
November 1997, Fremantle, Western Australia. 
Ezell B. C. (2007). Infrastructure vulnerability assessment model (I-VAM). Risk Analysis, 
Vol. 27, No. 3. 
www.intechopen.com
Uncertainties and Risk Analysis Related to  
Geohazards: From Practical Applications to Research Trends 
 
183 
Finno R.J. , Voss F.T., Rossow E., Tanner B. (2005). Evaluating Damage Potential in Buildings 
Affected by Excavations, Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental  
Engineering 131, No. 10, 1199-1210. 
Galesne Alain (1996), Choix des investissements dans l’entreprise, Rennes:Cerefia. 
Gilbert R.B. & Tang W.H. (1995), Model uncertainty in geotechnical reliability and decision 
analyses, Proceedings of Applications of Statistics and Probability, Lemaire, Favre 
& Mébarki (eds). Balkema. pp 109-114. 
Griot C. et Ayral P.A. (2001). Terminologie en science du risque, d'après le document de 
travail du colloque international “Dire le risque : le risque mis en examen”, Mèze, 
18-20 mai 2001. 
Grunthal G. European Macroseismic Scale. Centre Européen de Géodynamique et de 
Séismologie, Luxembourg. 1998; Vol. 15. 
Hacking Ian (1975), L’émergence de la probabilité, (Traduction de l’anglais, Seuil, 2002). 
Haimes Y. (2006). On the definition of vulnerabilities in measuring risks to infrastructures. 
Risk Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 2. 
Haimes Y. (2004), Risk Modeling, Assessment, and Management, 2nd revised ed., John 
Wiley & Sons Inc. 
HAZUS. Multi-hazard Loss Estimation Methodology Earthquake Model, Technical and User 
Manuals. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC. 1999, chapter 2. 
HAZUS®MH MR4, Multi-hazard Loss Estimation Methodology - Flood Model - Technical 
Manual 
Hofer E. (1996) When to separate uncertainties and when not to separate, Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety 54, 113-118. 
Hoskins C.G. (1973), Distinctions between Risk and Uncertainty. Journal of Business 
Finance, Spring. 
Jonkman S.N., Bockarjova M., Kok M. and Bernardini P.  Integrated hydrodynamic and 
economic modelling of flood damage in the Netherlands, Ecological economics 66 
(2008), 77–90. 
Karimi I. , Hüllermeier E. . Risk assessment system of natural hazards: A new approach 
based on fuzzy probability,  Fuzzy Sets and Systems 158 (2007) 987 – 999. 
Karmakar S., Simonovic S. P., Peck A., Black J. An Information System for Risk-Vulnerability 
Assessment to Flood, Journal of Geographic Information System, 2010, 2, 129-146 
doi:10.4236/jgis.2010.23020. 
Klein R.J.T., Nicholls R.J., Thomalla F. (2003). Resilience to natural hazards: how useful is 
this concept? Enviromental Hazards, 5, pp. 35-45. 
Knight F.H. (1921) Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. University of Chicago Press. 
Kwiatek J. Protection of constructions on surface ground mine. (Traduction in poland  
“Ochrona objektow budowlanych na terenach gorniczyych”).  GIG, Katowice, 1998. 
Lagomarsino S, Giovinazzi S. (2006). Macroseismic and mechanical models for the vulnerability 
and damage assessment of current buildings.  Earthquake Engineering , 4, 415–443. 
MATE (1997). Plans de prévention des risques naturels prévisibles – Guide général. La 
documentation Française 
McGill W. L., AYYUB B. M. and Kaminskiy M. (2007). Risk analysis for critical asset 
protection. Risk Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 5. 
McGuire RK. Seismic Hazard and risk analysis. EERI Earthquake Engineering research 
Institute, 2004. 
Merad M.M, Verdel T., Roy B., Kouniali S. (2004), Use of multi-criteria decision-aids for risk 
zoning and management of large area subjected to mining-induced hazards, 
Tunneling and Underground Space Technology 19 (2004) 125–138. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Risk Management for the Future – Theory and Cases 
 
184 
National Coal Board. Subsidence engineering handbook. 1975; 45-56 chapter 6. 
Neil Adger W. N., Vulnerability, Global Environmental Change 16 (2006) 268–281 
NRC (National Research Council, 1996), Understanding risk: Informing decision in a 
democratic society. Washington, DC, National Academies Press. 
Paté-Cornell M.E. (1996) Uncertainties in risk analysis: Six levels of treatment, Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety 54, 95-111 
Romeoa R., Paciellob A., Rinaldis D.. Seismic hazard maps of Italy including site effects, Soil 
Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering, Volume 20, Issues 1-4, 6 October 2000, 
Pages 85-92 
Ronald TE, Hope AS. Loss Estimation models and metrics Risk Assessment, modeling and 
Decision Support. 2008;135-157 
Roy B. (1985), Méthodologie multicritère d’aide à la décision, Paris, Economica. 
Roy B., Bouyssou D. (1993), Aide multicritère à la décision : Méthodes et cas, Paris, 
Economica. 
Saeidi A., Deck O., Verdel T. (2009) - Development of buildings vulnerability functions in 
subsidence regions from empirical methods – Engineering Structures 31 (2009), 
2275-2286. 
Saeidi A., Deck O., Verdel T. (2011) - Development of buildings vulnerability functions in 
subsidence regions from analytical methods – Geotechnique, A paraître 
Schmidtlein M. C., Deutsch R. C., Piegorsch W. W. and Cutter S. L. (2008). A sensitivity 
analysis of the social vulnerability index. Risk Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 4. 
Smith R.P. (2000), Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Engineering Design Decision Making, 
The Open Workshop on Decision-Based Design: Origin, Status, Promise, and 
Future, NSF, State University of New York at Buffalo.  
(http://dbd.eng.buffalo.edu/papers/rpsmith.html). 
Spence RJS, Kelman I, Baxter PJ, Zuccaro G, Petrazzuoli S. Residential building and 
occupant vulnerability to tephra fall. Journal of Natural Hazards and Earth System 
Sciences 2005 ; 5 : 477-494. 
Suddle S. , The weighted risk analysis, Safety Science, Volume 47, Issue 5, May 2009, Pages 
668-679. 
UN/ISDR (2004). Living with Risk - A global review of disaster reduction initiatives (2004 
version). 
USACE (US Army Corps of Engineers), 1996. Risk-based analysis for flood damage 
reduction studies. Report EM 1110-2-1619, 63. 
Veneziano, D. (1994). “Uncertainty and Expert Opinion in Geologic Hazards.” The Earth, 
Engi-neers, and Education: A symposium in Honor of Robert V. Whitman, 
Cambridge, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, MIT: 102-124 
Wagner H, Schumann EHR. Surface effect of total coal seam extractions by underground 
mining methods. J.S.Afr.Inst.Min.Metal 1991 ; 91:221-231. 
Wahlström R. Grünthal G.,  Probabilistic seismic hazard assessment (horizontal PGA) for 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark using different logic tree approaches, Soil Dynamics 
and Earthquake Engineering, Volume 20, Issues 1-4, 6 October 2000, 45-58. 
Whittaker B.N. et Reddish D.J. (1989). Subsidences : Occurrence, Prediction, Control. 
Editions Elsevier. 
Yu Z, Karmis M, Jarosz A, Haycocks, C. Development of damage criteria for buildings 
affected by mining subsidence. 6th annual workshop generic mineral technology 
centre mine system design and ground control 1988; 83-92. 
Zhai G., Fukuzono T. and Ikeda S. Modeling flood damage: case of Tokai flood 2000. Journal 
of the American Water Resources Association, february 2005, 77-92. 
www.intechopen.com
Risk Management for the Future - Theory and Cases
Edited by Dr Jan Emblemsvåg
ISBN 978-953-51-0571-8
Hard cover, 496 pages
Publisher InTech
Published online 25, April, 2012
Published in print edition April, 2012
InTech Europe
University Campus STeP Ri 
Slavka Krautzeka 83/A 
51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
Phone: +385 (51) 770 447 
Fax: +385 (51) 686 166
www.intechopen.com
InTech China
Unit 405, Office Block, Hotel Equatorial Shanghai 
No.65, Yan An Road (West), Shanghai, 200040, China 
Phone: +86-21-62489820 
Fax: +86-21-62489821
A large part of academic literature, business literature as well as practices in real life are resting on the
assumption that uncertainty and risk does not exist. We all know that this is not true, yet, a whole variety of
methods, tools and practices are not attuned to the fact that the future is uncertain and that risks are all
around us. However, despite risk management entering the agenda some decades ago, it has introduced risks
on its own as illustrated by the financial crisis. Here is a book that goes beyond risk management as it is today
and tries to discuss what needs to be improved further. The book also offers some cases.
How to reference
In order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Olivier Deck and Thierry Verdel (2012). Uncertainties and Risk Analysis Related to Geohazards: From
Practical Applications to Research Trends, Risk Management for the Future - Theory and Cases, Dr Jan
Emblemsvåg (Ed.), ISBN: 978-953-51-0571-8, InTech, Available from: http://www.intechopen.com/books/risk-
management-for-the-future-theory-and-cases/uncertainties-and-risk-analysis-related-to-geo-hazards-from-
practical-applications-to-research-tren
© 2012 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This is an open access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
